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PLURALITY OF ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE IN 
JURAL RELATIONS 
A RECENT writer has inveighed, not without some declamation, against the use of rhetoric in _the field of law-making.1 But 
rhetoric finds a place, and often an unprofitable one, not only in 
legislation, but evien in technical legal analysis. Metonymy (change 
of n~e) has often been pointed out. When we say that X is the 
owner of blackacre, what we mean is that X has certain legal ad-
vantages concerning blackacre; in other words, that X is the holder 
or dominus of claims (rights) and powers concerning certain land. 
Synecdoche (saying more or less than i~ meant) is very commonly 
found~ and _the illustrations are numerous in the interpretation of 
statutes. When "full faith and credit" are to be given to the judg-
ments of iµiother state certain exceptions are sometimes made, as, 
for example that the judgment must be responsive to the pleadings 
where the defendant has not appear~d. Again, a right 'against the 
whole world' may mean something less extensive than the words 
imply. Personification is a useful and necessary rhetorical figttre 
often employed by the law, not, of course, in mere words, but in 
deeds, as when, for example, a barrel of molasses which contains too 
much sulphur is condemned to destmction. Even the attribution of 
legal capacity to a human being amounts, in essence, to legal per-
sonification. Pleonasm (the use of redundant words) is a common 
vice often resorted to out of caution that nothing shall be omitted. 
It finds expression in such phrases as 'rights, claims, and demands,' 
and 'transfer, set over, alien, and convey.' Metaphor also abounds, 
as when we speak of an agent 'representing' his principal, of 'trans-
ferring' land, or of 'assigning' a contraet.2 
1 Tourtoulon, "Les Principes philosophiques de 1' Histoire de Droit" : 
Author's appendix to American edition: MoDtRN LtGAI. PHn.OSOPHY SlilUts, 
XIII. 
'Aylett v. Minnis (1791), Wythe 219 (225): ''When one saith he deviseth 
land, or bequeaths any other thing, the terms are elliptical; some words are 
left out but which are understood; and in such a case, the testator must mean 
that the devise or bequest shall have, not a sensible immediate operation upon 
the land or other thing said to be devised or bequeathed, but a mystical opera-
tion on his dominion, right, property, over to, in the land or other thing." 
In a note ( c} to the edition of 1795 it is quaintly remarked : ''Words have. 
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Other figures and abundant illustrations for all of them no doubt 
can read~y be found. Some of these figures can not be dispensed 
with, and perhaps all of them are at times useful; but metaphor and 
metonymy, which may be put in the useful group, are especially 
dangerous. In the ordinary case, like synecdoche, they serve the 
purpose of colloquial abbreviation, but in the analysis of new prob-
lems, and, particularly, borderline cases, they must be used, if used 
at all, with great caution. In these cases, and in every instance 
where accuracy of legal analysis is demanded, rhetorical figures of 
any sort and abbreviated forms of expression must be abandoned 
for precise and fundamental terminology. 
I 
In legal analysis the starting point is jural (legal) relation. .I1,1 a 
given situation of fact; the jural relation must be isolated and its 
content fully and accurately defined.3 
A jural (or, concretely, legal) relation is a situation where one 
person (who may be called the 'dominus' or 'holder') can control his 
conduct adversely as against another person (who may be called the 
'servus' or 'bearer') or where the dominus can control the conduct of 
the servus, with the aid of the law. It will be seen that there are 
two classes included under this defini9on: ( r) where the dominus 
can control his own act adversely, with the aid of the law,' toward 
the servus; (2) whex:e the dominus can, with the aid of the law, 
been called winged; and they well deserve that name when their abbrevia-
tions are compared with the progress which speech could make without these 
inventions." 
sFor an extended examination of this concept, see Cor,. L. Rev. (1920) 
XX, 394: ''Various Definitions of Jural Relation." 
• It is not sufficient in jural r~lations to say that an act can be controlled 
with "legal effect'', for illegal acts -also have legal effect in this that they create 
and destroy jural (legal)· relations. But since illegal acts are not aided by the 
law for the legal advantage of the actor, ilie capability of performing such an 
act does not constitute a jural relation. Capability of committing a tort or 
of violating a contract is not a jural power but a simple power. (A discus-
sion of quasi jural relations appears above.) Again, there are capabilities for 
acts which are legal and which have legal consequences, but which do not 
constrain others, and which, therefore, do not constitute jural relations (e. 
g., offer, abandonment, estoppel). 
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control an act of the servus. Each of these two situations has a 
double aspect, and the four aspects may be ~hown ·in a diagram: 
TABr.£ I. 
DO MINUS SERVUS 
ADVAN'rAGJl; CORnI.A'rMS· DISADVAN'rAGS 
Power .,._. Liability 
Privilege ] .,._. Inability 
Immunity ] ~ Disability 
Claim ~ Duty 
[EXPI.ANATION :-The arrows indicate the direction of the act. The 
brackets mean that the act can be obstructed.] 
The dominus (or holder) in a jural relation has a certain advan-
tage as aga_inst the s.ervus (or bearer). This advantage is either a 
power, or a privilege, or an immunity, or a claim (right). Lµte-
wise, when a jural relation exists, the servus (or bearer) has acer-
tain disadvantage as against the dominus. This disadvantage must 
be either a liability, or an inability, or a disability, or a duty. 
When the dominus has a 'power', be can act toward the servus 
with legal constraint; for example, an unpaid creditor may bring an 
action against his defaulting debtor; the debtor is under the dis-
advantage of a 'liability' to be sued. When the dominus has a._'priv-
ilege' he may .decline with legal constraint an act toward the servus; 
for example, be may refuse to testify in an action when called as a 
witness, upon the ground of liability of incrimination; the disadvan-
tage of the servus is an 'inability' to require the dominus to act (i.e. 
to testify). When the dominus bas an 'immunity' he can repel, with 
legal constraint, an act of the servus; for example, the doniinus can 
prevent the servus from taking his land in eminent domain proceed-
ings, on the ground of statutory exemption; the disadvantage of the 
servus is a 'disability' to act against the dominus. Lastly, the dominus 
may have a 'claim' (right) against the servus to have an act per-
formed by the servus; for example, to render services under a con-
tract; here the disadvantage of the servus is the 'duty' to do the act. 
In addition to jural relations of the strict type illustrated, there are 
also situations which resemble jural relations, but in which there is 
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lacking in the one asserting an advantage, a capability5 to make it 
effectual with the aid of the law. These relations may be called, for 
want of a more specific name, quasi jural relations. Where. it is 
necessary to distinguish the two kinds, the various advantages as-
serted in quasi jural (legal) relations may be called 'simple advan-
tages', and the advantages of jural (legal)-they may also be called 
'nexal'-relations may be called 'nexal advantages.' 
An illustration of these quasi jural advantages will be serviceable 
at this point. 
A parol gift made by A to B not accompanied by delivery of the 
chattel invests "B with a simple claim of title to the chattel.6 If A 
dies, trover could not be maintained by B against A's executor for 
refusal to deliver. If B makes a demand on the executor for delivery 
of the chattel, the executor may· decline. The executor's advantage 
is a privilege, but it is a simple privilege since the refusal of the 
executor in no way affects the conduct of B, nor does the law, in 
the situation stated, in any way interpose its aid. The executor cim 
not and need not ask legal assistance in declining B's demand based 
as it is on a (si~ple) claim which is legally ineffective. It will be 
•'Capability' is used here to· distinguish it from 'capacity'. Capacity is 
the general attribute of personality; it is the base upon which 'capabilities' 
(advantages) and disadvantages are founded. A person may have a capacity 
for a specific claim or power without being the actual holder of that claim 
or power. The antonym for 'capability' does not !;eem to be needed for the 
convenience of legal analysis, nor does the disadvantage side of jural rela-
tions seem to require a term with a function similar to 'capability'. The word 
that naturally suggests itself, 'incapability', would be as awkward to designate 
a duty as is the word 'obligation' as applied to a liability. (cf. SALYOITT>, 
"JURis."' § 77.) It is sufficient to speak of 'capacity for jural disadvantages', 
or more specifically 'capacity for legal duties and liabilities', and when, in 
definition or paraphrase, an introductory word is necessary the general term 
'disadvantage' may be employed. 
• Probably the most extensive field for the operation of the concept 
'simple claim' is in coruiection with the 'exceptio' of Roman law and the 
'Einrede' of modem civil law. See GAius, INST. IV, § § us-126; Posn:, 
"GA1 INST. ]UR. Crv."' 564 sq.; B~HMANN-Hor.r.~. "Ro:i.i:. ZIV. PR.," II, 388; 
LJt<>NHARD, "IRRTHUM," p. 301 ; BtKKSR. "PAN»." r § 28; .Kn.Ll!R, • "Roi.r. ZIV. 
PR." § J4. Imperfect legal relations which may be perfected by unilateral 
acts (e. g., ratification), also furnish many interesting illustrations oi quasi 
jural relations. 
See also note 9 post. 
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observed in the illustration just given, that B is the holder of a 
simple claim, while A, or his executor, is the holder of a simple priv-
ilege. B has a (simple) claim to have the chattel delivered to him 
on 'demand; A, or his executor, has a (simple) privilege to decline 
to delw~r the chattel on demand made.7 A conflict of this kind can 
never exist in jural relations. If B has a. nexal claim to have an act 
done by A, ,A cannot have a nexal privilege to decline the act re-
quired, though 'A does have a naked privilege to decline (i. e., he 
may actually decline and thereby subject himself to the sanction 
flowing from a violation of his nexal duty). 
T Acts with respect to the existence or non-existence of jural relations 
are of four kinds as shown in the following diagram : 
1
: Va~id. • ·}· • ~: • ·v~i~iabl~· ··} Jural 
Invalid 3. Ineffective 
4 Void ••••.••••••. ,Non-Jural 
Valid jural acts create nexal jural relations {e.g., offer and acceptance). 
They need not be further considered at this time. Void acts also need no 
further consideration because they constitute neither jural {nexal) nor quasi-
jural relations. 
Voidable jural acts create jural relations {e. g., grant of land by an in-
fant), but they are subject to the infirmity that the jural relation may be ter-
minated by the wi11 of another {e.g., the infant, in the example given). Unless 
the act is disaffirmed the {nexal) power to terminate the relation is i,µielf 
extinguished in the lapse of time. 
lneff ective jural acts do not immediately and direttly create nexal jural 
relations, but they bring into existence a legal 'substrate' {that very term has 
been used by the courts: Whitney v. Dutch (1817), 14 Mass. 457) upon 
which a nexal jural relation may be founded; for example, the executory 
promise of an infant. Until affirmed, the 'substrate' is a quasi jural relation. 
When affirmed, the quasi jural relation is transformed into a nexal jural re-
~tion. Whether the nexal relation 'relates back' is a matter of controversy 
{cf. Edmunds v. Mister, 58 Miss. 765) but the preferable technical operation 
as between the same parties is to validate the relation, with a11 its incidents, 
from the beginning. Interesting questions may arise where the quasi jural 
relation is not affirmed generally but with qualification. Theoretically, no 
reason appears why this may not be accomplished. 
A void act is non-jural; it is so far wanting in legal effect as between the 
parties that no legal relation or 'substrate' is created at the time of the act; 
nor can the act later be affirmed without an independetit jural act. {In some 
cases-illegality-the act can never be validated. For example, a promise to 
perform an act which is contrary to good morals can not be made valid by a 
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When a creditor A, holding an assignable chose in action against 
B, transfers it to C, and, later, makes a second assignment of the 
same chose in action to D, both acts of A are the exercise of simple 
powers. These acts of power of A involve no constraint on the con-
duct of either C or D, nor as against C or D are they adversary 
acts, (i. e. requiring the servus to limit his conduct after the act is 
completed.) As against the debtor, B, however, the power act (i. e. 
the assignment) is nexal since it requires him to limit his conduct in 
accordance with the legal effect of that act subjoined to further 
acts of the assignee. Assuming that the assignment first acted on 
in good faith i's legally effective, 8 if D (the second assignee) first 
gives notice of his (simple) claim (against B) to B in good faith, 
and in good faith on the part of B and D, the claim is paid, then D 
has exercised as against C (the first assign~e) a ( nexal) power 
the effect of which is to destroy the nexal claim of C against B. 
C, (the first assignee), however, as against A (the original creditor), 
had a simple immunity against the making by A of a second assign-
ment to D. This simple immunity was not effective to protect C 
against the destruction o~ his nexal claim. In the ordinary case, 
new promise upon a new consideration.) An ineffective act is also a nullity 
until 1t is affirmed (e.g., executory promise of an infant), but it differs from 
a void act (such as may be affirmed) in this that an ineffective act may be 
validated by a new dependent jural act (e. ~ .• simple ratification by an infant 
after attaining his majority, of a power of agency: Whitney v. Dutch, 14 
Mass. 457) while a void act can be validated (if at all) only by a new, inde-
pendent jural act (e. g., in the case of a contract, upon new consideration). 
A void act has no quasi jural 'substrate'. 
The illustration, above, of a gift without delivery, perhaps· goes to the 
verge of a quasi jural relation, since it seems difficult to imagine how the act 
now ineffective for want of delivery can be validated without delivery (cf. 
Gallagher v. Dohany, 65 Kans. 341, 69 Pac. 330) or its equivalent. Yet, 
situations may arise where the quasi jural character of the act may be dem-
onstrated. Thus, if the i:Ionee should inadvertently acquire the detention of 
a -chattel theretofore verbally 'given' to him but not delivered, the donor may 
by assenting to the possession of the donee, validate the ineffective gift; and 
/in that case the validating act (if general) would also as between the parties 
carry with it all accessory relations-accretions, interest, etc. Whether third 
persons could attack the situation on the theory of 'relation back' would be 
determined, or might be determined, on other grounds. 
•Since we are not concerned here with actual legal solutions of jural 
problems, illustrations will in general be disposed of hypothetically. 
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where plural advantages and disadvantages are not present in a 
given legal situation, a simple immunity would be effective against 
adversary acts. Thus, the title of A in a chattel can not be divested 
by B, -or any other person in the absence of other operative facts. 
A has a simple immunity and any' attempted transfer by B of A's 
title would be exercise not of a nexal, or. of a simple power, but of 
.a naked power. 9 
"The manifest difficulty of dealing in a systematic way with quasi jural 
relations, the alogical character of these relations, and, especially, the vexa-
tion of effort to draw a sharp line between simple legal advantages and naked 
,claims and powers, naturally presents the question, whether the effort is 
worth while. But it can not be disputed, whatever the labor required to bring 
-0rder out of chaos, that the usages of speech proclaim the existence of these 
various situations of fact, and it would seem to follow that the necessity of 
-distinguishing them cannot always be avoided. Three general methods of 
solution are possible: 
I. The first perhaps is no solution at all. It would, so it seems ignore 
,any distinction between jural (nexal) and non-jural relations. According to 
this view what is not forbidden "is just as real as a rule of law as a rule 
that forbids" (cf. HoH:FSJ> "FuND. ·Lr:CAI. CoN<:r:PTS," p. 48, n. 59). The dis-
-credited philosophic effort to milk a he-goat through a sieve could hardly be 
less productive for legal analysis than this expansive and highly indefinite 
-program for the law. If it be answered that legal analysis works with this 
~pparatus, it may be replied that it would work equally well without it, as is 
manifest in countless decisions of the courts. 
2. A second solution is to ignore any distinction between simple and 
-naked legal situations. Since there is always some danger of an art becoming 
too complex for practical use, this answer has much to commend ·it. A 
,modified form of this solution would be to accept some of the more important 
,distinctions suggested by the next solution. 3: The third solution would attempt to distinguish definitely the fields of 
.simple relations from the more primitive types in accordance with the usage 
ventured for illustrative purposes in the above text. It remains to state the 
-rationale of this practice as follows: 
Simple power (relation) is any situation where one may project an act 
toward another with legal consequences, but )Vitbout the constraining aid of 
the law. There are two varieties: (a) illegal powers (e.g., tort): and (b) 
'legal powers (e. g., offer). 
Simple privilege (relation) is a situation of non-subjection to a nexal 
claim of another, not accompanied by a coincident, adversary jural (nexal) 
relation, of which another is dominus, and where the correlative (simple) 
inability is not reciprocal to a nexal liability (e. g., simple privilege to refuse 
:Payment of a simple claim). 
Simple immunity (relation) is a situation of non-subjection to a nexal 
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The example of the chose in action above discussed with reference 
to some, but not all, of the jural and quasi relations involved in the 
legal situations given in a common and uncomplicated case, may 
suffice "to demonstrate the danger of relying too much on meta-
phorical, metonymic, or abbreviated figures in the analysis of legal 
problems, and it perhaps sufficiently shows the points of distinction 
between simple and nexal legal advantages, without further illus-
tration. 
II 
Jural relations, consisting of four distinct types of acts under the 
control of one person as against another, may be represented not only 
by a system of correlatives where a distinctive name is given to the 
dominant and servient side of each jural relation, but an examina-
power, not accompanied by a coincident, adversary jural (nexal) relation, of 
which another is dominus and where the correlative disability is not reciprocal 
to a nexal duty (e.g. simple immunity against transfer of one's title.) 
Simple claim (relation) is any situation where one may claim an act 
from another but where the claim lacks legal force (a) because of invalidity 
in the premises (not amounting to illegality, e. g., 'lex perfecta') or (b) be-
cause the premises are incomplete. In the first type (a) of claim (invalidity), 
a rough, general test of its character as·a simple claim would be its sufficiency 
to support a judgment on a motion in arrest after an overruled demurrer. 
In the second type (b) of simple claim, the incompleteness may occur (i) 
because, although a jural relation exists,-the simple claim is only a preliminary 
or partial element df its content ( e. g., simple duty, of the master to provide 
·his servant with a safe place to work) (cf. note 13, post); or (ii) because an 
act essential to a complete jural nexus has only been partially completed (as 
in a defective 'juristic act', e. g., oral gift without delivery). 
All other situations by exclusion would be naked, non-legal situations 
of fact. 
Another, special method of solution would be to attempt to find suitable 
terms for each simple and each naked, legal situation, avoiding the use of 
those employed for nexal relations; for example, a 'claim' not correlative to 
a nexal duty, might be called a 'demand', etc.; but invention here encounters 
the great, if not insuperable, difficulty of overcoming an inveterate usage 
which has appropriated a single series of terms for every variety of legal "and 
non-legal situation, and it seems best, therefore, to compromise with it. 
Since it is not reasonable to expect that the detailed explanation of the 
third solution above, will be regarded as of enough practical importance to 
require vigorous application, a rough, general test of quasi jural relations, to 
differentiate them quickly from the primitive types, may be proposed as fol-
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tion of the content (the act which is the expression of. conduct) in 
jural relations, discloses an internal relation among the four types 
of acts, which may be systematically arranged and described. 
Contraries. In contraries there are opposed directions of the con-
tent (act) of the jural relation. In 'power' the dominus acts or has 
a capability of acting, adversely, with the aid of the law against the 
servus. In 'claim', the jural act has a contrary motion, in the direc-
tion of the dominus from the servus. Power and claim may, there-
fore, be denominated contraries. Since, also, each of these acts pro-
ceeds without interruption either at the point of beginning or at the 
point of ending, these two jural relations may be called 'progressive 
jural relations.' Po.wer and claim are the principal types of jural 
relations, and the other two jural types, privilege and immunity, are 
only special varieties employed for the convenience of speech. 
Reciprocals. These are the sub-types of power and claim, ar-
ranged, respectively, with their principal types. Privilege is a spetjal 
kind of power; and iminunity .is a special kind of claim. Accordjng-
ly, power and privilege are reciprocals. As already suggested, the 
term privilege is used for convenience of speech to indicate an irreg-
ular or abnormal kind oi power; and immunity, for like convenience, 
is used to indicate an irregular or abnormal kind of claim. It would 
be inconvenient to say that one has privilege to decline the negative 
act of not uttering a slander while giving testimony in a lawsuit or 
when answering in good faith a request for information conc~ming 
a former employee. In such a case, it also seems over-emphatic to 
assert a (jural) power to utter a slander. Therefore, the declinatory 
aspect (privilege) of the act is united with its processive aspect 
(power) under the; expression "privilege to [do the act]" or, objec-
tively, a "privileged act." Privilege, therefore, is usually employed 
to indicate an effective declination of a negative act in a situation 
which departs "from the general rule. 
Immunity has a similar relation to claim and is employed to indi-
cate an effective repulsion of a positive act in a situation which de-
lows: (a) they either have legal consequences when put in motion or (b) 
they have legal color. It may be insisted, however, that a severe regard for 
the specific applications of the nexal relations is often of major importance 
in technical analysis of obscure legal problems, and that in no case, however 
simple, can they be misapplied without peril. 
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parts from the general rule. For example, one may be immune from 
a prosecution because of a general or special exemption. 
It is to be particularly noted, while the usage of speech gives to 
privilege and immunity a special applicatiop, that in jural relations, 
power and privilege, and immunity and claim, respectively, are 
always reciprocal. Thus, in the claim (right) of corporal integrity, 
the content of the claim (right), the negative act or acts which make 
the claim legally effective, is reciprocal to an immuity against the 
positive act or acts which infringe the claim (right). 
Sub-Contraries. Privilege and immunity are sub-contraries, in 
the sense that obstructed acts have contrary directions. In a priv-
ilege, the dominus can obstruct (decline) his own act as against the 
servus with the aid of the law; in an immunity, the dominus can 
obstruct (repel) an act of the servus toward the dominus. This 
group may be called 'regressive jural relations'. 
Negatives. !!'his category relates not to the direction of the con-
tent (acts) of jural relations, but to the affirmation or denial of a · 
quality in the content ( actS.) There are two sets of negatives, power 
and immunity, and claim and privilege. 
When a jural power exists, the dominus can act adversely with 
legal effect toward the &ervus. In an immunity, the servus cannot 
act effectively against the dominus. When a jural claim exists, the 
act of the servus may be required (it is attracted) by the dominus. 
In a ·privilege relation the act of the dominus cannot be required (it 
can be declined). 
These various cross connections in jural relations may be con-
veniently summarized in th.e following diagram: 
TABr.'S II. 
JURA!, OPPOSITION10 
POWER ..........••••••• contraries. • • •• • • . • • • • • • • • • . CLAIM 
... 
. . . 
Ul •••• 
11 ·········lleD-> 8 o~ 
c. nega 
·u ...... . f ....... . 
. . ... 
. ... 





PRIVILEGE ••.••••••.. sub-conmmes. • • . . • • • • •.. 1MMUNITY 
10 This table which is adapted front the 'scheme of opposition' found in 
elementary textbooks in logic cannot be carried out into the so-called 'laws · 
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III 
In a quasi jural relation there may be not only a coincidence of 
opposing quasi jural advantages in the same act which is the con-
tent of the relation, but this opposition, when it exists, is also one 
of logical conflict. Thus, if X has ·a claim against Y which is 
barred by the statute of limitations, X has a simple claim against Y 
to an act of performance, but Y has a simple privilege to decline 
performance. This logical conflict may exist in quasi jural rela-
tions because neither quasi dominus has the power to make his will 
effective by the aid of the law. Since claim and privilege are jural 
negatives· (see Table II), it is evident that in jural relations (strict 
sense) such a conflict could never exist. Moreover, as to the con-
tent of a single jural relation there can never be any opposition of 
contraries, sub-contraries, or negatives. If conflict appeared in any 
one of these respects, it would logically destroy the idea of jural 
relation.11 
Conflict is of two kinds: · .(a) logical; (b) potential. Logical 
conflict may exist in quasi jural relations considered singly or in 
combination, either with other quasi jural relations or with nexal 
(jural) relations. Potential conflict may exist in all cases where 
logical conflict may arise and also where there are plural jural re-
lations arising out of the same operative facts. Potential conflict 
may be increased by the introduction into the legal .situation of other 
persons with jural advantages or disadvantages; as, for example, in 
suretyship, trus.t, common ownership, joint and several acts.1 !? 
of opposition' as in logic. Metaphorically, perhaps, power and claim are 
forms of universal affirmation and negation depending on. the positive or nega-
tive content of the relation, and in like manner, privilege and immunity might 
be considered as forms of particular affirmation and negation. If such a re-
semblance may be asserted, it is clear that it ends there, since jural relations 
are not reducible as such to logical propositions. _ 
:11 In continental works, the subject of conflict of jural relations is treated 
under the title 'collision of rights': DERNBURG, "PAND.'" I § 42; HOLDER, 
"PAND." § 65; B£KKJiR, "P A:ND." I § 24; GttRKi;:, "PluvATRECH'J.'," I § 36; 
Rr:Gr:LSB£RG£R, "P AND." I § 55. 
12 B. G. B. 1631 provides that "the care of the child's person (by the father, 
by virtue of his parental power: B. G. B. 1627) includes the right and the duty 
* * * to exercise supervision over him." This is an instance where the same 
act is the content of plural jural relations. It is not a case, as it might seem, 
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Having regard to a simple legal situation in which the operative 
facts (a) concern only two persons, (b) involve not more than two 
coincident jural or quasi jural relations, or either of them, and ( c) 
in which temporal priority of one relation over another is ignored, 
we may show the variety of abstract permutations of jural advan-
tages and disadvantages in the following table: 
COINCIDf:NCf: O~ JURA.I. Rf:I.A'tIONS 










[Explanation: A means the advantage of the· relation, and D the dis-
advantage. Roman letters indicate nexal (jural) relations; italics indicate . 
quasi jural relations. For the purpose of indicating coincidence of specific 
jural relations, these specific relations may be numbered. Thus a jural power· 
is A1; a jural privilege is A2, a jural immunity is A•, and a jural claim is A'. 
The specific jural disadvantages will have a corresponding designation (e. g., 
a jural liability is, D') .] 
When it is recalled that each jural or quasi jural advantage may 
be any one of four distinct varieties :-power, privilege, immunity~ 
claim :-it is readily seen that the perinutations expressed in terms 
of these specific relations will be numerous even in the simple situa-
tions above represented. In order that the argument may be better 
understood, a few of·these coincid~ces will be selected and illus-
trated in types of case of common occurrence and free from tech-
nical difficulty in two aspects : (a) congruence, and (b) conflict : 
of logical conflict; the 'right' and the duty are not in the father in the same 
jural relation. The 'right' in the father against the child is a 'power' "to 
exercise supervision." As against third persons, this supervision is a "duty, 
for the father is responsible for the child's unlawful acts (B. G. B. 832). 
!URAL RELATIONS 
SERIES I: CONGRUENT COINCIDENCE 
CLASS: A A - D D 
1. Claim + Claim : Duty + Duty. 
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A' A' - D' D': Where a creditor receives his debtor's check as condi-
tional payment of the debt. In this case the creditor has two valid claims 
which are correlated by two legal duties. (Other jural relations also exist 
here, but they are not now in question. This qualification will not hereafter 
be repeated.) 
A' A' - D' D': New promise to pay a debt barred by limitation (where 
action lies upon the new promise.) In this case the old debt has lapsed by 
time into a simple claim and the new promise has created a new nexal claim. 
2. Claim + Immunity : Duty + Disability. 
A' A" - B' B": Exemption of chattels from levy by execution. In tliis 
case, the owner of the chattels has a negative claim, i. e., that the plaintiff 
do not cause the levy to be made, and a positive immunity that the plaintiff 
refrain from causing the levy to be made. The immunity is, of course, only 
the reciprocal of the claim, and its correlative is disability to proceed with the 
levy with the support of the law. While the sheriff, contrary to the immu-
nity, may proceed to execute, yet that act is not supported by the law and 
is illegal. It is a simple power act. 
A' A" - D' D": Where the creditor has a claim secttred by mortgage, 
assuming the rule to be that the debtor cannot even by tender of principal and 
interest to maturity (though.the contrary seems the better rule) demand a· 
release of the security, the claim of the creditor (mortgagee) is nexal, and 
his immunity against a termination of the relation before maturity of the 
debt is a simple immunity, since, there is no duty resting in the mortgagor 
not to terminate it by tender of payment in advance. The mortgagor is 
simply disabled by the terms of the agreement from making his will effective. 
3. Claim + Privilege : Duty + Inability. 
A' A~ - B' B': Negotiorum gestio, e.g., salvage of a shipwrecked ves-
sel. The salver has a nexal claim for his services based on his nexal privilege 
of saving the chattel. Ordinarily, i. e., when things are not in danger of loss 
or destruction, interference with a thing of another is tortious. Since the 
situation is an abnormal one, the intermeddling of the salver is properly 
called a privilege which is a special ·variefy of power. 
A' A" - D' D' :Bailment of a chattel for labor upon it. The bailee has 
a nexal claim for his services, and the bailment gives him a simple privilege 
of improving the chattel. ·The situation is not like the one last above described 
where one may intermeddle because of an abnormal ·situation. What the 
bailee does is done for his principal, and his acts of dealing with the chattel 
are not against the will of the principal but in accordance with it. Therefore, 
he exercises not a nexal but a simple privilege. 
4- Claim + Power : Duty + Liability. 
A' A1 - D' D': Pledge. The creditor has a nexal claim to payment at 
, maturity of the debt, and a nexal power to sell his security if the debt is 
not paid. 
60 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
-
N A' - D" D1: Pledge. 'The creditor has a nexal claim to payment at 
maturity .of the debt and a simple power to repledge the chattel for a greater 
sum than the debt. . 
SERIES II: CONFLICTING COINCIDENCE 
l. Claim + Duty : Duty + Claim. 
A' D' - D• A•: Pledge. The creditor has a nexal claim as last above 
shown, but the debtor also has a nexal claim for the return of the chattel 
upon making payment or tender of payment. It will be noticed that the 
conflict here is not in the same jural relation, but between two distinct jural 
relations. It is also to be emphasized that the conflict is not logical but 
potential. 
A' D' - D' N: Pledge. At maturity of the debt, the bailor has a claim 
(right) to' be reasonably notified of the time and place of the sale, if the 
bailee ex~cises his power of sale. If the sale is fairly conducted and no loss 
can be shown on account of the failure to give notice, assuming the rule to 
be that the bailor cannot recover even nominal damages, his claim to have 
notice given is a simple claim independent of the event.u There is present 
also a coincident nexal duty to pay the debt. 
2. Claim + Disability : Duty + Immunity • 
. A' Ds ..:.. D• As: Where certain chattels are exempt from leVY. a land-
lord though he has a nexal claim to payment of his rent is under a nexal 
disability to make a distraint on the exempt chattels.· Tlie disability is nexal 
from the fact that an attempt to do the disabled act is a violation of 
nexal duty. 
A' D1 - D• A 3 : Where an inadvertent wrongdoer has converted a chattel 
int'o a new product of great value,. assuming the rule to be that the original 
owner cannot recover the chattel as improved, ·the original owner in thi5 
legal situation has a nexal claim for the value of the chattel converted, but 
he is under a simple disability to convey the new chattel to a third person 
(that.is to say, such an attempted transfer of title would not be a violation 
of nexal duty not to do the act; it would be simply ineffective.) 
3. Claim + Inability : Duty + Privilege. 
u When it is said that a pledgee lies under a duty to give notice of sale 
of the pledge and that the pledgor has a right to have notice, assuming the 
rule to be as stated above (see Whipple v. Dutton, 175 Mass. 365, 56 N. E. 
sSr, 78 Am. St. Rep. 501 (1900), the statement is an abbreviated and inaccu-
rate one (cf. note 9, ante). It is similar to the rule as commonly stated, that 
a master must provide his servant with a safe place to work, which, also, is 
inaccurate. There is no nexal duty not to be negligent or not to deceive apart 
from consequences of actual harm to another (cf. Tulm.Y "LtADING PRIN-
~:· § III), but there is, no doubt, considerable utility in these abbreviated 
forms of legal expression as there is also in the emphasis of rights over 
duties ((cf. Holmes in .A:M.. L. Riw. 1871, V, l, sq. ST~, "FoUNDA'.l'IoNs;• 
III, 8, sq.); as indexes-nothing more-to legal reasoning. 
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A' n• - D' A": A tenant has a nexal claim against his cotenant net 
to be interfered with in the tenant's use of a thing, but he is under a nexal 
disadvantage (inability) to prevent the co-tenant's prior use of the thing. 
Each may use the thing "when he can see his time." · 
A' D" - D' A": Bailment. Where a chattel has been bailed for improve-
ment, the bailor is under a simple inability while the relation exists to require 
negative acts of the bailee in performance of the contract, but the bailor has 
a nexal claim to require negative acts of the bailee inconsistent with the 
contract. 
4 Claim + Liability : Duty + Power. 
A' D1 -D' A1 : Rescission. If goods are sold by X to Y "on sale or 
return," before the option of return is exercised, X has a nex:al claim but Y 
bas a nex:al power to destroy it. 
A' D'- D' A1 : In every case where there is a nexal claim (right) the 
bolder of the claim is subject to a simple liability that the beart:r of the nexal 
duty will not perform his duty. The violation of duty i's not a nex:al power, 
for while it has legal consequences, the law gives no aid to the wrongdoer. 
Since the power is not nexal, the correlative of it, likewise, cannot be nexal. 
· AI.B~R'r KocoUR£K. 
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